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Abstract. The paper discusses characteristics and qualities
of two routing protocols – Collection Tree Protocol and its
secure modification. The original protocol, as well as other
protocols for wireless sensors, solves only problems of ra-
dio communication and limited resources. Our design of the
secure protocol tries to solve also the essential security ob-
jectives. For the evaluation of properties of our protocol in
large networks, a TOSSIM simulator was used. Our effort
was to show the influence of the modification of the routing
protocol to its behavior and quality of routing trees. We have
proved that adding security into protocol design does not
necessarily mean higher demands for data transfer, power
consumption or worse protocol efficiency. In the paper, we
manifest that security in the protocol may be achieved with
low cost and may offer similar performance as the original
protocol.
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1. Introduction
The paper proposes modifications of the routing Col-
lection Tree Protocol (CTP) [2] with regard to the essential
security objectives. We were interested in how the protocol
modification influences the quality of the routing path and
the amount of radio communication. Our goal was to prove
that such modification does not necessarily lead to worse
performance.
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are typical exam-
ples of computation and energy constrained devices. Sensor
nodes are mostly powered by alkaline AA batteries, that are
not rechargeable and therefore their working time is usually
short, typically several weeks (or several months in case of
using expensive D lithium batteries) [3]. Radio communi-
cation of nodes is usually unreliable and belongs to the most
energy consuming tasks. Common network protocols are not
suitable for this kind of networks, thus special protocols are
needed. Such protocols have to transmit minimum amount
of data and (in most applications) information about infras-
tructure is not available in advance .
One of today’s standard platforms for low-cost sensor
networks is TinyOS [5], which is currently distributed in ver-
sion 2.x. The last stable version 1.x is, however, still of-
ten used. The organization developing this low level oper-
ating system for sensor networks, TinyOS working groups,
is publishing technical papers about protocols and schemes
for sensor networks – TEP (TinyOS Enhancement Propos-
als) [5]. One of the TEPs describes Collection Tree Protocol
(CTP), which is a routing protocol suitable for sensing ap-
plications. The CTP is also distributed as a part of TinyOS-
2.x [2].
1.2 Collection Tree Protocol
The Collection Tree Protocol (CTP) is a simple tree-
based protocol proposed for collection of data from sensor
nodes into the root node. All the communication is many-
to-one or one-to-many. The nodes form a set of routing
trees, whereas multiple root nodes are allowed. The CTP
is address-free protocol. The sensors send data packets to
the next hop whereas routes are based on a routing gradient.
The protocol has the following properties [2]:
• CTP assumes that it has link quality estimates of some
nearby neighbors. These provide an estimate of the
number and quality of transmissions it takes for the
node to send a unicast packet whose acknowledgment
is successfully received.
• CTP has several mechanisms to improve delivery reli-
ability, but it does not promise 100 % reliable delivery.
It is best effort, but a best effort that tries very hard.
• CTP is designed for relatively low traffic rates.
Bandwidth-consuming systems might benefit from
a different protocol, which can, for example, pack mul-
tiple small frames into a single data-link packet.
• CTP uses expected transmissions (ETX) as its routing
gradient. A root has an ETX of 0. The ETX of a node
is the ETX of its parent plus the ETX of its link to its
parent. If several routes are valid, CTP should choose
the one with the lowest ETX value.
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This protocol was proposed for data gathering with low
energy demands. Routes established during node deploy-
ment are not updated periodically, but only if inconsistency
in the network topology is detected. A loop is detected when
node chooses a route with gradient value significantly higher
then its old one. This may be caused by losing connectiv-
ity with the current parent node. The CTP offers two so-
lutions: (1) beacon frame and (2) ignoring routes with an
ETX higher than a reasonable constant. The protocol pro-
vides also a handle for packet duplication. When a duplicate
instance of a packet is detected during its forwarding, it is
dropped.
The CTP is designed in the light of minimum power
consumption and the only considered threats were uninten-
tional threats. Is has no countermeasure against a motivated
attacker and therefore its implementation into applications
used in hostile environment is usually unacceptable. Our aim
was to propose such improvement of CTP that offers high
network protection at the cost of small energy overhead.
1.3 Sensors with Tamper-Resistant Modules
Wireless sensors used in practical applications are usu-
ally low-cost, low-power and small-size devices mostly
without any essential physical protection. Each improve-
ment of covering, computing performance or sensors leads
to the higher price or higher demand of power resources [4].
Wireless sensor networks used in a hostile environment are
highly vulnerable to any physical manipulation. As the sen-
sor nodes provide many input/output channels together with
hidden channels, it is almost impossible to design reliable
data protection. Tamper-resistant covering is able to pro-
tect computational core of the sensor node, however attached
sensors for sensing parameters of hostile environment are
still unprotected. Thus, it is better to define tamper-resistant
sensor node as a sensor node composed of two portions:
(1) common sensor node hardware as the tamper-vulnerable
portion and (2) tamper-resistant module.
Our previous work ([6, 7]) was concerned to design se-
cure but low-cost sensor node platform. The concept of the
platform is based on wiring of sensor node with a tamper-
resistant module. Our results have been proved in real hard-
ware and have shown that by using specialized hardware, we
can reduce power consumption and improve the security at
small cost. This is important especially for effective imple-
mentation of asymmetric and strong symmetric cryptogra-
phy, that belongs to the most complex algorithms for sensor
nodes. When the concept of partially tamper-resistant sensor
nodes was proved, we proposed a modification of the CTP to
utilize the security properties of the platform.
2. Secure Collection Tree Protocol
The Secure Collection Tree Protocol (Secure-CTP) was
designed for sensor nodes with tamper-resistant modules [7].
Smart cards offer best benefit-price ratio, thus are used a
tamper-resistant modules. Connection of the smart card and
node micro-controller is realized by serial interface. Radio
communication channel is considered to be non-trustworthy.
The smart card is powered up only for cryptographic opera-
tions. If the sensor is in idle mode, the smart card is turned
off.
The most significant changes in the Secure-CTP pro-
tocol are (1) usage of a unique 16-bit identifier, (2) modi-
fied usage of ETX, (3) usage of Routing Frame Counter and
(4) usage of Message Authentication Code (MAC) used for
providing integrity and authentication. Each sensor node has
a unique, 16-bit identifier stored in the smart card (ID). The
identifier is read-only and is defined during production time
of tamper-resistant sensors. Each transmitted frame has the
ID of last hop sensor and message authentication code at-
tached. The smart card also holds master key (shared by
all smart cards in the network) and monotonic counter. The
master key never leaves smart card and may be used only
as a parameter of cryptographic routines. This key together
with node identifiers is used for generation of the session key
and thus it never leaves the smart card as well.
When the node receives a routing frame with better
routing path, the frame is forwarded to smart card together
with link quality estimation to the source node. In the smart
card, a session key is generated from the master key, source
ID and current node ID. This key is used for validation of
MAC of the original routing frame and after modification of
ETX also for generation of the new MAC. This new frame is
then forwarded back to the sensor board.
Data security is provided by symmetric cryptography,
as probably all ISO/IEC 7816 smart cards offer 3DES or
AES encryption at high speeds. The chosen encryption al-
gorithm defines 64-bit data blocks. Key length is 112 bits
for 3DES and 128 bits for AES. Integrity of the frames is
protected by CBC-MAC [8]. From the 64-bit MAC, only the
last 32 bits are used. Frames without MAC are dropped.
Routing frames are protected by 32-bit monotonic rout-
ing frame counter (RFC). Sensor node accepts routing frame
with a higher value of counter, or with a lower value, but the
difference is within an allowed range. Routing packets with
other counter value are dropped. Recommended allowed
range of RFC is from 28 up to 210. This range enables syn-
chronization, if the sensor node had received broken packets
because of radio transmission problems. Lower values could
cause synchronization problems, higher values could be mis-
used to counter overflow. New sensor node added to the net-
work has not received any RFC before. Thus, a special flag
inside secure memory is set to indicate that any RFC from
a valid routing frame may be accepted.
ETX value of the last routing frame is stored in secure
storage and it is incremented in a limited range. This mod-
ification in contrast to CTP enables only to increment ETX
by 1, 2, or 3 bits (that means 1-2, 1-4, or 1-8), depending
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on implementation. We suppose that using more bits for link
estimation does not have significant influence. Root nodes
may initiate re-establishment of routing tables. They are the
only nodes that could create zero ETX routing frames. When
inconsistency of routes is detected, the nodes should inform
the root node by sending a beacon frame. This frame has to
be protected by MAC to avoid beacon frame injection. Root
node responds to received inconsistency by sending routing
frames with zero ETX.
2.1 Frame Formats
Communication architectures for networked sensors
are mostly based on the Active Messages model [9]. This
layer is used as a network layer for CTP and Secure-CTP
protocol. Active message frame (Fig. 1) is used for trans-
portation of any higher level frame.
In the Secure-CTP we proposed the following changes:
addition of (1) RFC and (2) MAC to the Routing Frame. In
contrast to the CTP, we also defined addition of last hop
ID and frame counter. In the implementation of CTP in
TinyOS-2.x, frame counter is already used, however it’s not
mentioned in the specification. Modifications of the rout-
ing frame format can be seen in Figs. 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c).
Beacon frame format is missing in the CTP specification as
well. Thus, for the simulation of the CTP and Secure-CTP
we have used the same format – see Fig. 2.
2.2 Security
Our goal was to propose such modifications that fulfill
at least the essential security requirements. In case of routing
protocol, the most important are authentication, integrity and
freshness. If the routing protocol provides these services, the
attacker cannot affect establishment of routing paths.
Confidentiality is usually not necessary for routing
protocols, as the routing path is not a sensitive informa-
tion. Moreover, wireless sensor networks based on 802.15.4
cannot guarantee availability as the radio channel may be
jammed. Cryptographic mechanisms of Secure-CTP satis-
fies these essential security goals.
3. Link Quality Estimation
We must also mention that despite of high frame er-
ror rate (FER) between very far nodes, while transmitting
thousands of frames, it’s highly probable that some nodes
capture also frames from low-quality channels. Therefore,
each routing protocol has to employ some distance function
for evaluation of radio channel quality. Current sensor nodes
do not offer link quality estimator implemented in hardware.
There are also no direct information from the hardware about
invalid received frames. Thus, software link estimators have
to use frame counters, which also prolongs the frames.
Routing protocols for ad-hoc networks need to evaluate
the quality of paths to the other nodes. Frames are transmit-
Fig. 1. Active message frame format.
Fig. 2. Beacon frame format.
(a) Routing frame format of CTP according the specification.
(b) Routing frame format of CTP from the simulation.
(c) Routing frame format of Secure-CTP.
Fig. 3. Routing frame format of CTP and Secure-CTP.
ted over the nodes with (1−FER) probability, whereas sig-
nal strength descents by the square of the distance. Quality
of the channel in the routing protocol is given by the chosen
link estimator or by the chosen algorithm. The CTP does not
define link quality calculation, however its implementation
in TinyOS-2.x uses LinkEstimator library, that is supplied
with the TinyOS-2.x. Link quality is directly used for cal-
culation of the ETX. In the specification, there is also no
information about prolonging of transmitted frames by the
LinkEstimator library.
Due to unavailability of this library for TinyOS-1.x, we
have defined our own link estimator that was used in both
protocols, CTP and Secure-CTP, to do proper evaluation and
comparison of protocol characteristics. Original implemen-
tation of LinkEstimator library from TinyOS-2.x appends
a special header to each transmitted frame. Upper 8 bits of
the header are used as flags, lower 8 bits are used as a frame
counter. Our implementation of the link estimator appends
a 16-bit last hop ID and 8-bit frame counter, which is 8 bits
more than the original protocol. However, we do not assume
any significant changes in behavior in comparison to imple-
mentation in TinyOS-2.x.
The frame counter is unique for each node and is used
for calculation of (1) all transmitted frames, (2) number of
received frames from each node and thus (3) the link qual-
ity. Each node holds these counters and parameters for all
92 P. PECHO, P. HANA´CˇEK, J. NAGY, SIMULATION AND EVALUATION OF CTP AND SECURE-CTP PROTOCOLS
neighbor nodes. During the implementation, we have found
that 8 bits per counter offers sufficient precision for quality
calculations. If the counter of received frame would over-
flow by receiving the next frame, all counters for given node
are divided by 2 (or shifted by 1 bit to the right). This oper-
ation also serves for elimination of older link quality infor-
mation.
Link quality is then given as:
ET X =
f ramesrecv ∗256
f ramestotal
. (1)
ETX for Secure-CTP is reduced to 1 – 3 bits in consider-
ation of probabilistic distribution of the link quality in the
simulated network.
4. Protocol Evaluation Methodology
Radio communication interface, also used in WSNs,
suffers from unreliability and communication collisions.
Each protocol designed for radio ad-hoc networks has to be
designed with regard to these restrictions. Moreover, sensor
nodes have very limited power sources, so the communica-
tion should be as effective as possible. Each transmitted or
received byte shortens the network lifetime. Current sensor
nodes mostly use radio controllers that consume the same
energy for transmitting and capturing the frames [10]. Thus,
any unnecessary transmission withdraws energy of sending
node as well as receiving the frames. This is important espe-
cially for broadcast communication, when not only the frame
header, but rather the whole frames are received – see active
message format.
During design of a new routing protocol, it is rather
difficult to find the most effective path with regard to power
consumption. Long hops are less reliable and the frames
need to be retransmitted, but the retransmission of lower
amount of frames spends less energy. On the other hand,
multiple short hops may offer higher reliability, so mini-
mum of frames needs to be retransmitted. Higher number
of hops and frames, however, may also cause higher power
consumption.
Routing protocols may also be evaluated in the light of
volume of transmitted data, length of the routing paths, nec-
essary time for establishment of routing paths, reliability of
routing trees, security objectives and others. For this evalu-
ation, we have compared the routing protocols with regard
to power consumption. The routing tree established by CTP
is considered as the best solution. The protocols are com-
pared with regard to the volume of transmitted and received
bytes, that may be directly used for calculations of consumed
energy. We were also focused on the number of frames nec-
essary for establishment of the whole routing tree.
Sensor networks platform does not offer additional in-
formation about collisions during frame transmission, thus
we do not know how much energy was spent for an unsuc-
cessful transmissions. For this evaluation we will consider
that each collision has occurred in the middle of the trans-
mission.
5. Simulation Model
Evaluation of the protocol may be done by formal anal-
ysis or using a simulation. For our purpose we have chosen
the second method, as we were interested in behavior of the
protocol in large scale networks. For simulations we chose
TOSSIM, a discrete event simulator for TinyOS sensor net-
works [1]. The simulator implements a radio stack that is al-
most identical to the MICA* 40Kbit RFM-based stack. Thus
it may be used for evaluation of radio communication includ-
ing collisions. Limited radio range is modeled by a lossy ra-
dio model, whereas a directed graph defines the probability
of receiving a corrupted bit. This characteristic of commu-
nication among the nodes is also known as the bit error rate
(BER).
Fig. 4. Distribution of Nodes for Sensor Network Simulation.
The TOSSIM is distributed with a generator of lossy radio
model, which creates models according to the BER value.
However, it does not offer information about node positions
that are necessary for evaluation of routing protocol. We de-
signed and implemented another configurable generator of
radio lossy model. This generator gives the radio model as
well as a graphical representation of sensor node distribu-
tion. Using such information, it is possible to evaluate rout-
ing protocol for correctness and efficiency of the implemen-
tation. In Fig. 4, you can see the simulated sensor network
with highlighted best communication channels.
Our aim was to evaluate the establishment of the rout-
ing tree and the effectiveness of this process. We were in-
terested in different behavior of CTP and Secure CTP, espe-
cially in the influence of the protocol modification to:
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• Quality of routing paths and volume of radio commu-
nication,
• collisions in the radio communication (due to extended
routing frames),
• quality of routing paths depending on ETX length,
• convergence of quality of routing paths.
We did not implement nor simulate any application
protocol. In case of simulation or communication in a real
application, the results depend on node deployment, applica-
tion type and characteristics of the environment. Therefore,
we were only focused on the process of establishment of the
routing tree.
Extending the transmitting frames usually leads to
overhead of radio communication. Moreover, any changes
in the routing scheme may also lead to unpredictable be-
haviour. We were focused on propagation of actual value
of RFC in the sensor network as this step has a direct influ-
ence on rescission of the forwarded routing information. Be-
cause of unreliable radio communication, nodes in the same
location may hold various values of RFC at the same time.
Different locations of the sensor network may hold much dif-
ferent RFC, so it’s not likely that nodes successfully forward
the routing information to distant locations.
For simulation purpose we use a sensor network that
consists of 100 nodes with minimum distance median of
nodes of 5.0 length units and maximum communication dis-
tance of 200 length units. The same deployment of nodes
was used for evaluation of CTP and Secure CTP protocol.
Each simulation consists of 10 runs and the results were sta-
tistically processed. Each simulation takes 60 virtual sec-
onds and the sensor nodes boot over the first 10 seconds.
The achieved results were validated by two runs of simula-
tions.
Simulation model implements one retransmission of
broken frames to improve radio reliability. If we consider
a link of 99 % BER and 16-byte frame, this improvement
decreases the FER from 72.3 7% to 52.37 %. An example of
an established routing tree can be seen in Fig. 5.
6. Evaluations
At first we were interested in distribution of reliabil-
ity of link qualities and thus calculation of effective ETX.
We tried to find out if the whole range of ETX is already
used. Afterwards, we focused on protocol communication
during routing tree establishment, especially the amount and
type of received and sent frames. During the simulation we
observed a dependency of transmitted data to the number of
established route paths. We supposed linear dependency. We
were interested in influence of the modified, and particularly
longer, frames on the number of radio collisions during the
transmission. All three variants of Secure-CTP with 1, 2, or
3-bit ETX were tested.
Fig. 5. Example of Established Routing Tree Using S-CTP with
2-bit ETX.
Fig. 6. Dependency of number of links on their reliability.
6.1 Calculation of ETX
Calculation of ETX is important for Secure-CTP proto-
col, as this protocol tries to use the minimum range of ETX.
Using the simulation we tried to find statistics of reliability
of the links between sensor nodes. In Fig. 6, you can see
the statistics of link qualities gained from the simulations. In
the graph a poisson distribution of link qualities can be seen.
95 % of all links reach the value of 64 on average. To mini-
mize the ETX range, only a few bits can be used. Next in the
simulation, we tried to find out the influence of ETX length
on the routing tree and the process of its establishment as
well. In the implementation, only the lower 6 bits are used
(i.e. 0 – 63). Better quality links saturate in this range.
6.2 Amount of Radio Communication
In the next part, we focused on the amount and type
of frames necessary for establishment of routing paths to the
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10 %, 50 %, 90 % and 100 % of network nodes. The num-
ber of transmitted and received bytes directly determines the
consumed energy.
Results of this simulation has shown that adding secu-
rity to the CTP protocol has a small influence on the total
received and transmitted bytes. In Tab. 2 you can see the
number of received and transmitted beacon frames (BF) and
routing frames (RF), as well as the total amount of bytes pro-
cessed by the radio subsystem. The statistics are counted
for 10 %, 50 %, 90 % and 100 % of established paths.
Each simulation was taken twice and consists of 10 simu-
lation runs. The simulations were evaluated independently,
whereas number of simulation run is also in Tab. 2. To re-
duce random factors, median and standard deviation of each
simulation were computed.
Random factors may cause collisions in radio commu-
nications. In the beginning of routing tree establishment, the
nodes can start communication at the same time. That may
lead to communication overhead as the frames need to be
re-transmitted. That is why the number of frames may sig-
nificantly differ between the simulation runs.
In case of CTP there are a lot of small frames trans-
mitted, while in case of Secure-CTP a smaller number of
larger frames is transmitted. We believe that this behavior is
caused by adding the RFC to the routing frame, thus older
routing frames are dropped more often. We have found that
modified usage of ETX has minimal effect on the process of
routing tree establishment. The length of ETX has also no
significant impact on the amount of data.
In the graph (Fig. 7), there is a dependence of the es-
tablished paths on the total received and transmitted data. It
is evident that the amount of communication rises exponen-
tially. The most of transferred data can be seen for the last
10 % of nodes. Energy needed to establishment of these
paths is similar to amount of energy necessary for estab-
lishing paths to the previous 90 % percent. This energy is
slightly higher for Secure-CTP however the difference is ir-
relevant. We suppose this is probably caused by distribution
of different value of RFC through the network. The shift
of the Secure-CTP with 1-bit ETX in graph may be caused
due to random effects, however the trend is similar to other
variants of Secure-CTP.
6.3 Collisions of Radio Communication
One of the most significant changes in Secure-CTP
is extending the frames, which may have influence on the
higher amount of collisions of radio communication. Re-
sults of the simulation (Tab. 1) has shown, that Secure-CTP
does not suffer from more collisions than the CTP. Thus, in
the next calculations we did not take into account collisions
during data transmission. We believe that lower amount of
collisions is the consequence of lower amount of transmit-
ted frames due to usage of RFC. In all the calculations the
simulation time was included, which is 60 virtual seconds.
Fig. 7. Dependence of established paths on total data.
CTP S-CTP S-CTP S-CTP
– 1-bit ETX 2-bit ETX 3-bit ETX
Total frames 42,901 32,226 32,335 32,392
Total collisions 55,352 45,027 39,075 42,870
Collision prob. 0.568 0.582 0.547 0.569
Tab. 1. Collision probability in the radio channel.
6.4 Routing Tree Convergence and Quality
Despite the efficiency and reliability of routing tree es-
tablishment, fast convergence of the paths belongs to the im-
portant characteristics of the routing protocols. For the next
evaluation, we suppose that the network has the only suit-
able configuration of routing paths. If several possible trees
are available, they have similar quality. In the calculations,
median of ETX and median of hops are used as qualitative
properties. Averaging of the medians was used for elimina-
tion of random biases.
The evaluation was focused on alteration of routing
paths quality in the amount of received routing frames.
When 90 % of routing paths were established, the simula-
tion starts. We were looking for the amount of data neces-
sary for stabilizing the routing tree. The less routing frames
are transmitted, the less energy is consumed by the routing
protocol.
Graphical representations of the results (Figs. 8, 9, 10,
11) show that 1000 routing frames on average are necessary
for stabilizing the routing tree. The results hold for the CTP
and all variants of Secure-CTP. We have to mention the simi-
larity of routing path quality of the CTP and the Secure-CTP
with 1-bit ETX. Both protocols have converged to the same
median of hops. This characteristic rises with the length of
ETX. Thus we assume that the Secure-CTP with 1-bit ETX
offers similar quality of the routing paths as the CTP.
The results cannot be compared by median of paths
ETX as the CTP and Secure-CTP are based on a different
distance function.
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(a) Median of hops. (b) Median of ETX.
Fig. 8. Routing tree convergence of the CTP.
(a) Simulation 1. (b) Simulation 2.
Fig. 9. Routing tree convergence of the Secure-CTP with 1-bit ETX.
(a) Simulation 1. (b) Simulation 2.
Fig. 10. Routing tree convergence of the Secure-CTP with 2-bit ETX.
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10% depl. nodes 50% depl. nodes 90% depl. nodes 100% depl. nodes
Protocol ETX Sim. Operation / Frame Total frames Total frames Total frames Total frames
Median St.dev. Median St.dev. Median St.dev. Median St.dev.
CTP – 1
recv(BF) 653 913 689 896 759 935 833 945
send(BF) 91 96 97 96 105 99 110 100
recv(RF) 9 4 323 176 1,531 521 3,288 847
send(RF) 11 1 106 33 398 98 807 218
Total bytes 7,775 10,728 16,355 11,988 40,150 19,820 73,110 37,890
CTP – 2
recv(BF) 365 457 412 455 426 498 442 516
send(BF) 58 53 63 53 65 57 65 58
recv(RF) 12 2 447 187 1,680 233 3,025 503
send(RF) 11 1 122 41 458 66 798 127
Total bytes 4,543 5,996 15,435 9,460 37,893 19,296 61,825 38,026
Secure-CTP 1 bit 1
recv(BF) 1,777 1,065 1,868 1,079 2,059 1,149 2,081 1,154
send(BF) 216 109 234 112 260 122 269 122
recv(RF) 11 4 172 75 832 178 3,342 1,252
send(RF) 11 1 82 17 309 39 1,176 415
Total bytes 20,438 14,227 27,644 15,505 52,234 25,146 126,973 74,481
Secure-CTP 1 bit 2
recv(BF) 335 895 382 898 423 944 449 954
send(BF) 65 96 70 98 77 106 81 108
recv(RF) 10 3 265 89 995 192 2,177 1,100
send(RF) 11 1 103 23 352 51 682 357
Total bytes 4,501 11,115 14,510 13,578 42,048 24,845 74,365 65,050
Secure-CTP 2 bits 1
recv(BF) 472 581 573 584 621 635 652 637
send(BF) 79 64 89 66 97 74 110 76
recv(RF) 11 1 278 120 1,126 169 3,121 731
send(RF) 10 1 107 23 364 27 1,114 246
Total bytes 5,931 7,619 17,794 10,423 41,486 23,071 103,164 64,365
Secure-CTP 2 bits 2
recv(BF) 385 1,090 441 1,073 466 1,121 510 1,127
send(BF) 68 118 73 115 83 125 89 129
recv(RF) 10 1 280 135 962 146 3,612 1,225
send(RF) 10 0 99 30 336 32 1,194 384
Total bytes 4,955 13,008 16,218 15,504 38,633 26,020 127,459 79,663
Secure-CTP 3 bits 1
recv(BF) 545 1,011 565 989 578 1,041 584 1,045
send(BF) 84 106 88 107 92 116 95 115
recv(RF) 10 8 310 147 1,068 268 2,611 855
send(RF) 11 2 101 32 351 62 927 299
Total bytes 6,745 11,865 18,504 15,088 43,331 24,334 102,329 57,128
Secure-CTP 3 bits 2
recv(BF) 261 606 365 607 389 643 409 651
send(BF) 62 71 76 73 79 78 86 80
recv(RF) 13 4 347 157 939 217 3,071 872
send(RF) 11 1 132 34 334 45 1,075 289
Total bytes 3,777 7,259 16,539 11,072 39,848 20,668 103,493 59,275
Tab. 2. Statistics of radio transmission for establishment of routing paths.
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(a) Simulation 1. (b) Simulation 2.
Fig. 11. Routing tree convergence of the Secure-CTP with 3-bit ETX.
7. Conclusion
Our effort was to find the influence of modifications
in the Secure-CTP with regard to the original protocol. We
tried to prove that adding security into the protocols does not
necessarily mean higher demands on data transfer and thus
power consumption. Using the simulation of the CTP and
three variants of Secure-CTP similar behavior of protocols
in networks of 100 nodes was proved. During the establish-
ment of routing path of up to the 90 % of nodes, the differ-
encies in protocols’ behaviour was irrelevant. A significant
change comes while establishing the last 10 % of routing
paths. However, this increase is evident also in the CTP.
The expected rise of collisions in the radio communication
wasn’t proved. This is due to lower traffic in the networks,
despite longer routing frames.
Finally, the convergence of the routing tree was com-
pared. The results have shown that the CTP and Secure-CTP
with 1-bit ETX offer similar characteristics of established
routing paths. However, all the variants of Secure-CTP as
well as the CTP need the same amount of routing frames.
We believe that the communication overhead during estab-
lishment of the last paths in the network is only caused by
longer frames.
In the paper we manifest that security in the protocols
may be achieved with low cost. The CTP and Secure-CTP
with 1-bit ETX offer the same result. We have to mention,
however, that design of efficient routing protocols for large
ad-hoc networks is difficult and it is not evident how the
changes will affect the protocol behavior.
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